Since the end of the Cold War, the US has consistently cast itself as the principal crisis manager in South Asia, particularly during moments of acute military escalation between Pakistan and India. Each of these episodes saw the US assume the role of mediator, but rather than producing a durable peace, US involvement has perpetuated a cycle of dependency on Washington’s diplomacy.
Over time, the efficacy of US mediation has diminished. India, emboldened by growing US support, has distanced itself from bilateralism with Pakistan, while Washington’s strategic tilt toward New Delhi has reinforced Indian assertiveness. Against this backdrop, a fundamental rethinking of the mediation framework in South Asia is required.
This Insight argues that the time has come to consider a China–Russia mediated arrangement, which, given both countries’ unique leverage with Pakistan and India respectively, could offer a more balanced and sustainable path to peace.
The US role in South Asia has largely been reactive, focused on conflict management rather than conflict resolution. During the Kargil War in 1999, US President Bill Clinton pressed Pakistan to withdraw from the conflict, which helped avert escalation but left Islamabad alienated and reinforced India’s international standing.
In 2001–02, following the attack on the Indian Parliament, Washington’s shuttle diplomacy succeeded in defusing tensions. However, it failed to move India and Pakistan toward a meaningful dialogue on Kashmir.
The Mumbai attacks of 2008 marked a turning point, as India suspended the Composite Dialogue, and Washington largely prioritised counterterrorism cooperation with New Delhi over reconciliation with Islamabad.
Similarly, after the Pathankot and Uri incidents in 2016, US statements tacitly endorsed India’s so-called “surgical strikes,” lending legitimacy to unilateral Indian military actions.
During the Pulwama–Balakot crisis of 2019, Washington helped de-escalate after Pakistan downed an Indian fighter jet, but its broader posture again privileged India’s narrative while marginalising Pakistan’s concerns.
The 2025 Pahalgam crisis marked a departure. The US adopted an unusually detached stance, reflecting Washington’s frustration with India, especially in relation to its deepening energy ties with Russia, which helped Russia immensely during its war with Ukraine. However, even this “cold shoulder” did not translate into pressure for India to engage constructively with Pakistan. This long record demonstrates that US diplomacy has acted as a short-term fire extinguisher but has not paved the way toward sustainable peace in South Asia.
One significant consequence of US involvement has been India’s steady withdrawal from any structured engagement with Pakistan. The Composite Dialogue process was effectively terminated after the 2008 Mumbai attacks, while in 2016 India sabotaged the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) summit in Islamabad, signalling its unwillingness to promote regional integration. In 2019, India unilaterally abrogated Articles 370 and 35A of its Constitution, altering the status of Jammu and Kashmir and foreclosing dialogue.
More recently, New Delhi has challenged the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT), long hailed as one of the most successful conflict management frameworks in international relations, by holding it in abeyance in 2025.
India has also boycotted sporting ties with Pakistan, particularly cricket, thereby extending its strategy of isolation into the cultural domain. These actions, far from reflecting a desire for reconciliation, illustrate a deliberate policy of disassociation, enabled by Washington’s diplomatic and strategic patronage.
The scale of this disengagement can be gauged by the decline in bilateral trade. India–Pakistan trade fell from US$2.6 billion in 2012–13 to less than US$500 million by 2020–21, before being suspended entirely in 2019 following the abrogation of Article 370. This economic estrangement mirrors the broader political and cultural distancing between the two neighbours.
The limitations of US mediation stem from deeper structural factors. First, Washington’s strategic realignment toward India has positioned New Delhi as a central pillar of the US Indo-Pacific Strategy. This framework, epitomised in the QUAD, envisions India as a counterweight to China, and thus privileges India’s security and diplomatic concerns over Pakistan.
Second, Pakistan’s engagement with Washington is only transactional—whether for counterterrorism cooperation, tactical crisis management, or to put pressure on India—rather than as a partner in long-term stability.
Third, US support for India across defence, economy, and technology has emboldened New Delhi’s hardline stance vis-à-vis Pakistan. In the last two decades, the US and India have signed three foundational defence agreements—LEMOA (2016), COMCASA (2018), and BECA (2020)—which enable unprecedented interoperability and intelligence sharing. US defence exports to India grew from US$200 million in 2000 to over US$20 billion by 2020, marking India as one of Washington’s largest arms clients.
Finally, sustained instability in South Asia indirectly serves US strategic objectives by constraining China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). A stable Pakistan–India relationship would enhance the viability of the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and its extensions toward Central Asia—something Washington does not consider to be in its strategic interest.
In contrast to the US approach, a China–Russia mediated framework offers structural advantages. India has historically depended on Russia for defence procurement: between 2000 and 2020, approximately 65–70% of India’s military imports came from Russia, including key platforms such as the Su-30MKI fighter jets, S-400 air defence systems, and nuclear-powered submarines. Following the Ukraine war, Russia became India’s top energy supplier, accounting for 35% of India’s crude oil imports in 2023, up from less than 1% in 2021.
Pakistan, meanwhile, enjoys an “all-weather” (iron brother) partnership with China. The CPEC, launched in 2015, represents more than US$62 billion in pledged infrastructure and energy projects, making it the single most significant component of Beijing’s BRI (Sacks, 2021). China is also Pakistan’s largest supplier of military hardware, providing JF-17 fighter aircraft, HQ-9 air defence systems, and naval frigates.
China and Russia are themselves strategic partners, coordinating within platforms such as BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). Both countries have a vested interest in regional stability, given their connectivity projects and aspirations for a multipolar order. The SCO already includes both India and Pakistan, offering a ready-made institutional mechanism that could be leveraged for dialogue. Unlike Washington, whose interests are shaped by global competition with China, Beijing and Moscow would prioritise stability in South Asia to safeguard their own strategic and economic interests.
To operationalise such a framework, several steps are necessary. First, India, Pakistan, China, and Russia could establish a quadrilateral forum dedicated explicitly to South Asian stability.
Second, both countries should adopt confidence-building measures (CBMs), such as agreements on ceasefire monitoring, revitalisation of military hotlines, restarting the stalled cooperation mechanisms like Composite Dialogue, SAARC, etc. and reaffirmation of water-sharing commitments.
Third, discreet Track-II initiatives involving former officials and policy experts could serve as a testing ground for more formal dialogue.
Russia, leveraging its defence and energy ties, is well-positioned to nudge India toward re-engagement, while China can reassure Pakistan that its interests, especially Kashmir, will not be compromised. The aim would not be to impose solutions but to create structured dialogue mechanisms that move beyond Washington’s episodic crisis diplomacy. Over time, such a framework could reduce the heavy reliance on US mediation and lay the groundwork for regional ownership of peace.
While the Hindutva-driven politics of the Modi government remain a significant obstacle, the recent US snub of India during the Pahalgam crisis creates a narrow window of opportunity. Sustainable peace in South Asia requires regional ownership, and a China–Russia framework could represent the first genuine step in that direction.