The Indus Waters Treaty (1960) (“IWT”) governs water-sharing between Pakistan and India and establishes the Permanent Indus Commission (“PIC”) as the ‘regular channel’ for data exchange, implementation, and dispute resolution. Under the IWT, Pakistan and India must regularly exchange hydrological data—including daily gauge/discharge readings, reservoir releases, and canal withdrawals—transmitted monthly (and more frequently upon request). The two Commissioners for Indus Waters, one appointed by each Party, jointly constitute the PIC and serve as the “regular channel of communication” for such exchanges. Accordingly, timely PIC-channelled data exchange is a central legal obligation of the IWT, not a matter of discretion.
Until the PIC’s last meeting in New Delhi (May 2022), the Parties generally discharged these data-exchange obligations. Thereafter, India called for renegotiation of the IWT and, in April 2025, announced that aspects of treaty cooperation would be held “in abeyance”. Soon after, on 27 April 2025, a sudden rise in Jhelum River levels caused flooding in Pakistan-administered Kashmir. A week later, India released water from dams in Indian-administered Kashmir without prior notification through the PIC, contributing to higher flows in the Chenab. More recently, during Pakistan’s monsoon season, the Indian High Commission conveyed a flood alert regarding the River Tawi via diplomatic channels rather than through the Commissioners for Indus Waters as contemplated by the IWT.
India has described these alerts as communications sent on humanitarian grounds while simultaneously maintaining that the IWT remains “in abeyance”. Pakistan has formally objected, noting that bypassing the PIC contravenes the IWT’s procedures. Pakistan views this as an attempt to establish a new normal of minimal, non-treaty data exchange and has publicly alleged treaty violations, reiterating that the IWT does not permit unilateral suspension. While the legality of India’s claimed “abeyance” is disputed, routing flood alerts through diplomatic channels rather than the PIC represents a notable departure from established practice and raises questions about compliance with core IWT obligations, particularly those relating to data exchange.
Compliance with the IWT’s data-exchange regime turns on three inseparable elements: the content to be exchanged, the reporting frequency, and the channel through which it is exchanged. Article VI identifies the content—the core hydrological datasets such as daily gauge/discharge readings, reservoir releases, and canal withdrawals—and sets the reporting frequency: compiled and transmitted monthly, and more frequently upon request of either Party. Article VIII identifies the channel: the Commissioners for Indus Waters acting through the PIC as the regular channel for IWT implementation, “in particular” for furnishing information and data provided for in the IWT. Read with the Preamble, these provisions—as the Court of Arbitration (“CoA”) has underscored—underpin the cooperation that is “central to the good-faith interpretation and application of the Treaty” and require information-sharing and related procedures to be performed so their purpose can be realised.
Against that legal baseline, India’s recent practice—routing flood alerts via diplomatic missions on humanitarian grounds while holding the IWT “in abeyance”—appears to conflict with Articles VI and VIII. First, substituting ad hoc alerts for the Article VI dataset under-delivers on the IWT’s defined content and reporting frequency. Secondly, routing those alerts outside the PIC displaces the designated channel that gives the regime its institutional integrity: records, a shared archive, and the ability to seek clarifications. Pakistan’s position appears consistent: humanitarian alerts may supplement communications in exigency, but they cannot substitute for PIC-channelled exchanges of the Article VI dataset on the required reporting frequency.
The PIC channel is technical by design: Article VIII envisages the appointment of Commissioners who should “ordinarily be high-ranking engineers competent in hydrology and water-use” —precisely because flood forecasting, reservoir operations, power dispatch, and evacuation planning depend on standardised, queryable data exchanged on a predictable timetable. As the CoA has noted, the PIC “plays a critical role in promoting cooperation, transparency, and information sharing … by acting as the designated mechanism for the exchange of data and for the monitoring of the Parties’ uses of the Indus system of rivers.” PIC-channelled exchanges provide a common audit trail and a forum for immediate questions. Diplomatic alerts, by contrast, are episodic and non-standardised and, according to Pakistan, have been less detailed than in prior years. Accordingly, the content, reporting frequency, and channel of data exchange are not mere technicalities; they are the means by which the IWT ensures “the most complete and satisfactory utilisation of the waters of the Indus system of rivers.”
Pakistan’s first recourse may lie within the IWT’s own machinery. Under Articles VIII and IX, Pakistan could request a special PIC meeting to table possible departures from Articles VI and VIII, seek clarifications, and request rectification. Even if a meeting were not held, placing detailed objections on the PIC record—dates, content gaps relative to the Article VI dataset, and the use of diplomatic channels—could demonstrate good-faith bilateral engagement “at the level of the Commissioners” and preserve the contemporaneous trail the IWT appears to anticipate before escalation.
If no resolution were forthcoming, the dispute could move to Annexure G. The issues at stake—asserted “abeyance,” potential under-delivery of the Article VI dataset, and any bypassing of the PIC—may be characterized as questions of interpretation and compliance rather than narrow technical “differences,” in which case a CoA under Annexure G, rather than a Neutral Expert under Annexure F, could be the appropriate forum. Pakistan’s Request could set out the issues and relief sought and nominate its arbitrator; if bilateral appointments were not completed, Annex G allows resort to the World Bank-linked appointing functions so the CoA can be constituted. Once constituted, Pakistan could seek interim measures directing resumption of PIC-channelled Article VI data exchanges pending award, with the aim of preserving asserted rights and avoiding potential irreparable harm. On the merits, Pakistan may consider seeking a declaration regarding compliance with Articles VI and VIII. CoA decisions carry binding effect, and recent awards may be read to indicate that unilateral “abeyance” does not suspend IWT mechanisms or limit the Court’s competence.
In parallel, Pakistan could proceed in an evidence-led, methodical manner:
- Compile a consolidated record of post-April 2025 flood alerts, comparing what was provided against the Article VI dataset and prior practice under the IWT.
- Develop a causation file with technical agencies to quantify potential lead-time effects and operational impacts.
- Continue formal démarches citing Articles VI, VIII, and XII while signalling potential escalation under Article IX.
- Maintain Pakistan’s own compliance and continue inviting PIC engagement to help preserve credibility and may support any application for interim or final relief before a CoA.
- Brief partners discreetly with measured, rule-of-law messaging that aims to restore the agreed technical channel while avoiding politicization.
- Ready the Annex G Request and appointments pathway; once a CoA is constituted, file for interim measures to channel Article VI data exchanges through the PIC pending final award.