India's Pursuit of Hypersonic Weapons and its Implications for Pakistan

Hypersonic Weapons (HWs) capable of exceeding Mach 5 speed (>1 mile/sec) are a transformative advancement in missile technology. India’s aggressive pursuit of these HWs introduces a broad spectrum of implications and challenges for regional security and stability. HWs are broadly of two types: Hypersonic Glide Vehicles (HGVs) and Hypersonic Cruise Missiles (HCMs). Their enormous speed, manoeuvrability, and pinpoint accuracy make them the most lethal missiles, significantly complicating and challenging existing air defence paradigms. This insight argues that the Indian pursuit of Hypersonic Weapons is a potent threat to the strategic stability between India and Pakistan.

India, among a few other countries, has demonstrated hypersonic capabilities worldwide. A growing global appetite for HWs is at its peak these days. The graph shows the current and future projection of the Hypersonic market.

Rapid growth in the Hypersonic Missile market has been witnessed in recent years. By the end of this decade, it is expected to grow from US$8.5 billion in 2024 to US$18 billion in 2032, with an overall compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 9.8%.

China and Russia are leading the HW race, followed by the US, India, and North Korea. Major powers started concentrating efforts to attain hypersonic weapons in the 21st century, especially after the US withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty in 2002, catalysing the HW race.

However, the US did not prioritise the pursuit of HWs; instead, it invested in parallel technologies. The status of the current global hypersonic inventory is as follows.

Russia has the most active and diverse arsenal of HWs in its inventory and is India's primary defence partner. India’s Hypersonic ambitions date back to early 2000’s, when the then-president of India, Abdul Kalam, discussed the idea of the Brahmos 2 hypersonic missile; later, in 2009, India signed an MoU with Russia in the field of Hypersonic Missiles, and work started jointly by India’s Defense and Research Organisation (DRDO) and Russia’s Mashinostroyenia. Both countries are part of the MTCR (Missile Technology Control Regime), further facilitating India's access to advanced, sensitive, and restricted missile technology.

On November 16, 2024, India’s DRDO successfully tested the country’s first Long Range Hypersonic Missile (an anti-ship missile) from Abdul Kalam Island near the coast of Odisha. The missile is reported to have a range of 1500 km. It is capable of carrying both conventional and nuclear payloads. Its range covers the whole of Pakistan and essential choke points in the South China Sea (SCS). This test shows India’s aggressive Military modernisation, ultimately threatening regional stability. The following timeline depicts the development of the Indian Hypersonic Weapon Programme.

The induction of HWs by India would significantly alter the complex and delicate security architecture of the South Asian region. Pakistan does not possess these HWs and has no defence technology to intercept them, making it vulnerable. This would have multifaceted and adverse implications for Pakistan, as India and Pakistan are both overtly nuclearised neighbouring nations that share a history of persistent, recurring conflicts.

The desire to acquire these HWs and the subsequent offensive and defensive measures (based on the action-reaction model) to counter them can trigger an arms race, ultimately destabilising the region. As crisis stability is essential to strategic stability, these dual-capable ultra-high-speed HWs can reach the target quickly, reducing crucial response time and options that cause crisis instability.

These Indian HWs would further reduce the short-range missile flight time, which is currently 5-10 minutes between India and Pakistan, to 2-3 minutes. This means that the Observe, Orient, Decode, and Act (OODA) loop, which most countries use to assess and respond to the threat, would be considerably compressed, increasing the chances of misperception and accidental launches.

Indian asymmetric increase in strike capabilities can also complicate the complex naval security calculus of the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). HWs would enhance India's Anti-Access and Area Denial (A2/AD) capabilities in IOR, which is of increasing strategic importance to Pakistan.

India receives free passes and technological transfers from Russia and the US in the defence sector. At the same time, the US is imposing discriminatory sanctions on Pakistan’s missile programme. SAARC is not functioning, however Pakistan can diplomatically engage with South Asian countries other than India and take them into confidence to formulate some regional arms control measures.

Pakistan has to respond to this significant military modernisation of India and counter this by exploring all options. There is no publicly disclosed evidence of Pakistan developing domestic hypersonic technology. However, Pakistan has a very well-established indigenous missile programme, that can look into creating its own HWs (after doing a cost-benefit analysis). On a parallel, Pakistan can further synthesise its second strike capability, develop Anti Satellite (ASAT) capability to deter India from a counterforce strike and invest in missile defence systems, such as air defence and counter-hypersonic systems, possibly with countries like China or Russia, to reduce the threat posed by advanced missile technologies.