The US-India strategic partnership represents one of the most significant geopolitical realignments of the post-Cold War era. From a relationship characterised as "estranged democracies" during much of the 20th Century, it has evolved into a comprehensive global strategic partnership with far-reaching implications for Asia-Pacific security architecture.
This Insight argues that the US has successfully exploited the weakest link in the Russia-India-China (RIC) strategic triangle by drawing India towards the US, though this success remains partial due to India's apparent commitment to the notion of strategic autonomy, leading to potential regional instability.
The early decades of US-India relations were characterised by strategic divergence despite shared democratic values. India's founding leadership pursued a policy of so-called non-alignment, while simultaneously developing closer ties with the USSR as a counterweight to the US-Pakistan close partnership.
However, the disintegration of the USSR and India's subsequent economic crisis created the “necessary conditions” for a fundamental reorientation of the US-India bilateral relations. India's 1991 economic liberalisation dismantled protectionist frameworks and actively sought foreign investment and trade relationships. This period witnessed several critical developments for a closer US-India partnership.
India's economic liberalisation in the 1990s created opportunities for US investment, particularly in information technology, pharmaceuticals, and services. Bilateral trade grew steadily as India reduced tariffs and opened previously protected sectors.
The 1998 Indian nuclear tests initially strained relations, prompting US sanctions under the Glenn Amendment. However, the subsequent Strobe Talbott-Jaswant Singh Dialogue established a foundation for closer nuclear ties between the US and India.
The 1999 Kargil conflict saw unprecedented US support for India, with the Clinton Administration pressing Pakistan to agree to a ceasefire. Following 9/11, counterterrorism cooperation emerged as a significant shared interest, with India being designated by the US as a "natural ally" in 2001.
The most significant breakthrough came in 2005 with the US-India Civil Nuclear Deal (officially the 123 Agreement), which recognised India as a de facto nuclear weapons state while bringing portions of its nuclear programme under international safeguards. This agreement signalled the US’ acceptance of India as a strategic partner despite non-proliferation concerns, fundamentally transforming the relationship's character.
The civil nuclear agreement paved the way for systematic institutionalisation of the strategic partnership through a series of foundational defence agreements and enhanced diplomatic mechanisms.
The General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA-2002) established protocols for sharing classified military information between the two governments, enabling greater technology cooperation in the defence sector.
The Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA-2016) allows both militaries to use each other's bases for replenishment and supplies, creating crucial logistical frameworks for extended operations in the Asia-Pacific.
The Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA-2018) enables the US to provide India with encrypted communications systems, allowing secure interoperability between military platforms.
The Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA-2020) facilitates the sharing of geospatial intelligence, enhancing targeting capabilities and situational awareness.
The US-India partnership has also developed an extensive matrix of joint military exercises that build interoperability and establish patterns of cooperation:
- Malabar Naval Exercises: Originally bilateral, now including Japan and Australia, creating a de facto quadrilateral security framework.
- Yudh Abhyas and Vajra Prahar: Annual army and special forces exercises, respectively.
- Tiger Triumph: Tri-service exercises demonstrating comprehensive operational integration.
Defence trade has expanded dramatically, with the US becoming one of India's top arms suppliers. The Defence Technology and Trade Initiative (DTTI) has sought to co-develop and co-produce advanced weapons systems, moving beyond a simple buyer-seller relationship. In 2016, the US designated India as a "Major Defence Partner," granting access to defence technology comparable to that of America's closest allies.
The 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue, bringing together foreign and defence ministers from both countries, has emerged as the primary mechanism for coordinating strategic and security policy. Additional frameworks like the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) with Japan and Australia, and regional groupings like the East Asia Summit, provide multilateral dimensions to the partnership with an explicit focus on countering Chinese influence.
Rise of China represents the central geopolitical context for the deepening US-India partnership. Both nations share concerns about China's growing influence in the Asia-Pacific. Nearly half of the world's commercial shipping and two-thirds of global oil trade transit Indian Ocean Sea lanes, making maritime security a vital shared interest. China's efforts to secure its maritime interests in the region are termed as the "string of pearls" strategy, which allegedly threatens Indian and US interests.
China's assertive stance along its border with India, especially post Indian abrogation of Article 370 and 35A of its constitution, has heightened New Delhi's threat matrix. The 2020 Galwan Valley clash, which resulted in more Indian and fewer Chinese casualties, reinforced India's perception that it must strengthen its military capabilities.
China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), particularly the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and port development projects in Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Myanmar, creates a perceived strategic encirclement from India's perspective.
The RIC grouping, which later evolved into BRICS, is one of the leading geoeconomic mechanisms representing the Global South. From RIC, the US has successfully exploited the weakest link in this arrangement by drawing India towards the American orbit. Recognising India as a "major defence partner" and supporting its broader international profile, including backing for a permanent UN Security Council seat.
The US has also supported alternative infrastructure initiatives to counter China's BRI, including the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) and the Blue Dot Network, which promote high-quality, transparent infrastructure development standards.
The Transforming the Relationship Utilising Strategic Technology (TRUST) initiative, launched in 2025, focuses on collaboration in artificial intelligence, quantum computing, telecommunications, and defence technology, representing a shift from competition to co-development.
However, despite significant convergence, the US-India partnership continues to face substantial challenges stemming from India's quest for a multi-vector policy. India continues significant defence cooperation with Russia, including the 2021 purchase of S-400 air defence systems, triggering threats of US sanctions under CAATSA. India has also expanded purchases of Russian crude oil, citing economic pragmatism. India's development of Chabahar Port, while framed as providing access to Central Asia creates friction with the US sanctions policy.
The Trump administration's imposition of tariffs on Indian imports (particularly steel and aluminium) and India's retaliatory tariffs have created persistent trade tensions. The US revocation of India's Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) status in 2019 further complicated economic relations. The US maintains India on its "priority watch list" for inadequate IP protection, creating friction in the pharmaceutical and technology sectors.
India's dubious diplomatic approach, as manifested during several international crises, is creating some diplomatic friction between the two countries e.g. India's refusal to join Western sanctions against Russia and continued neutrality in UN votes have frustrated US policymakers. Moreover, in May 2025, when India started an unprovoked military escalation with Pakistan, the US chose to snub India on several accounts including its offer to mediate on Kashmir, accepting that India lost several fighter aircrafts and announcement for brokering ceasefire between Pakistan and India.
In summary, the US-India strategic partnership has evolved remarkably from the Cold War estrangement to comprehensive engagement, driven primarily by the US interests but presented as shared concerns about China's rise. At the same time, and unlike during the Cold War, these mutual cooperative mechanisms/ arrangements have also given the US enough leverage within the Indian socioeconomic and political system to manipulate the Indian polity as per the US interests.
Recent friction points, particularly India's defence and energy ties with Russia and growing Sino-India trade relations, represent an inevitable geopolitical reality. For the US, this one-sided love affair is over, and it seems to be payback time for India, to which the latter is apparently resisting, though with limited options.
In case India does not conform to the US strategic designs in the Asia-Pacific, there is an increased likelihood of continuous political and military instability in South Asia. Such an instability will serve the US interests more than it serves the Chinese interests, which seek greater stability for the purpose of enhancing regional economic integration.